The development pipeline "Nord Stream" and "South Stream" would enshrine in the second opinion of them, the charter of the European energy dependency on the Kremlin. This objection is probably the result of winning a new version of a revised and corrected maccarthysmo aiming to warn the "unarmed" and "naive" by the Europeans to encourage the return of Russia as a major player in this complex geopolitical scenario that is inexorably moving towards multipolarity. Just as the United States had made fun of that gonzo Gorbachev, the area of \u200b\u200binfluence extending far beyond the limits of NATO agreed, now Russia is regaining positions, weaving relationships with all major players in Eurasia. This is what is happening, but with a perspective of totally new era of 'Cold War'. To understand this new perspective, however, should take a few steps back, and return to the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine in 2004, culminating with the rise to power of Viktor Jushenko Atlanticist. Jushenko was now the star of a series of diplomatic clashes with Russia rather hard, opposing a large tax increase resulting from the transit of Russian gas pipes in Ukraine, Gazprom's demand to bring the price of gas sold to Ukraine to normal market levels. The dispute between the two lasted for several years, and culminated in January 2009, at the end of the contract regulating the terms of the transit, when Gazprom decided to terminate the flow of gas to Europe. It was a skilful move, which gave way to colorless bureaucrats in Brussels to perceive what was urgent to find ways of energy supply stable and independent of the internal turmoil within the country. The election, in February, the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich has also brought a significant relaxation of relations between Kiev and Moscow, a friendliness that has made possible the ratification of an agreement by which Ukraine was granted the right to use the 30% discount on supplies of Russian gas in exchange for a series of military and economic concessions to the Kremlin. Despite the reconciliation between the two nations, the need to create new structures for the transit of oil has remained, for too long as Russia and Europe had been "held hostage" of the convoluted political maneuvering in Ukraine. In light of this finding, the construction of the pipeline "Nord Stream" and "South Stream" and then appears a sensible solution to the problem, taking into account the significant political problems of various kinds (such as Poland Katcynski era) that persist in other Eastern countries, understandably wary of the Kremlin. The "Nord Stream", when completed, will plow the waters of the Baltic and come directly to Germany, while the "South Stream" (in which Eni is called to do the lion's share) will cross the Black Sea, Bulgaria , will be the route south to Greece and Apulia and north to Austria and Hungary. E 'at this point that the terminally atlases are used to concentrate the fire, stirring obsessively spectrum of European dependence on Russia. In practical terms has been given the go-to point to the realization of the Nabucco pipeline (the construction of which is sponsored by the EU and United States), many analysts considered a credible alternative to the "South Stream", since many nations-pass "turbulent "and allow Europe to source the part of non-Russian gas but from the countries of Central Asia. The development of this pipeline, however, is greatly influenced by the bad relations that Washington has with Iran's Ahmadinejad. Right now, lean on the "South Stream" indeed seems to offer different guarantees more than what would result from filling up by the "Nabucco". From a strictly political point of view, Atlanticists argue that pandering to the Kremlin's plans, Europe would find itself subject to the oppressive Russian hegemony. Beyond the incredible hypocrisy shown by them (there is, for Europe, something more oppressive and stifling of American hegemony?), It is shown how their case alarmist inexorably collide with reality. Unlike in the U.S., the seeds - the nation's total oil and gas producing economy has heavily influenced by exports, the net profits from the sale of oil, the GDP of countries with this type of economy might disappear in one fell swoop. Russia has a need to export hydrocarbons probably greater than Europe does not have to import. Subtracting the energy asset currently available, will be reduced to the recession comparable to that Yeltsin era. The same is obviously true for Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Iran, a nation condemned without appeal by the many "useful idiots" (at best) who insist on not wanting to consider the possibility that the declared uranium enrichment by Tehran is aimed at achieving non-military and civilian purposes, while the diversification of energy sources is a road that many countries are starting to take. In any case, it should be noted that the United States were well aware of the limitations inherent Soviet economy (and that still prevail in a country like Russia) already close to the end of the Cold War, when (probably in 1986) to liberalize the sale of Alaskan oil and began to make its advanced technologies in the service of the European powers in NATO member in order to facilitate the extraction of oil from the North Sea, entering large amounts of oil on the international market was in fact to promote a dramatic fall in prices per barrel (which reached $ 10 in May), which in turn sort devastating and irreversible impact on the fragile Soviet economy, as it was anchored to the oil and gas market. Secondly, there are no credible alternatives in a position to cover the possible release (very welcome in that perspective in Washington) from Moscow. The gradual decline of extractions gasifier in deposits of the Mediterranean and the North Sea reveals the undeniable fact that Europe is running out of their resources, and supplies from North African countries are not sufficient to cover requirements. The polished economist Stefano Casertano writes that "Considering the 560 billion current consumption, we must subtract 60 billion cubic meters of reduced production in Europe, and we get 500 billion. To these we add 20 more arriving in 2020 from Algeria and 60 in most other countries, added to the initial 500, we get 580 billion cubic meters of gas. To reach 640 billion cubic meters in 2020 there are still 60 billion. The first solution is called Russia. "The road indicated by Casertano is actually safer and more convenient for Europe, both from the geopolitical point of view (proximity to Russia and the extent of its huge deposits are conditions that no other producer country is able to offer), how much, and perhaps more, from the policy level. If Europe decides to turn his back unfortunately, even partially, to Russia, Putin might turn their gaze entirely to the east towards the Chinese giant, literally hungry for energy supplies. Deng Xiaoping advocated the occurrence of "hiding its claws as it develops its power" and China, faithful to this principle, has many fabric textures with Central Asian countries, wisely putting the mute to their success. In Turkmenistan, the skilled strategists in Beijing have signed agreements extremely important, which allowed the construction of a pipeline which will bring 40 billion cubic meters of gas for 30 years, and a pipeline with a capacity of 200,000 barrels of oil a day. At present, China produces about 75 billion cubic meters of gas per year and consumes about eighty, but various estimates suggest that by 2030 one third of the nation's gas needs will be fully covered by foreign imports. The pipeline will likely be a substantial improvement soon, and also will be attached to the network gasifera Kazakhstan, another major producing country. The unusual aspect of the matter is that for the first time Moscow has left a free hand to a country historically gravitating around its orbit, allowing the Turkmen Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov scaltrissimo prime minister to deal directly with China, potentially competing nation in the medium term. Against Iran has not been given the same treatment, while both Russia and China have expressed before the Security Council met specifically, his vote in favor of applying new sanctions on Tehran. Ahmadinejad and Chavez was in fact flirting with Erdogan being sidelined from the negotiations on Russia, and is probably keeping in mind this "recklessness" that Iran is good to read the outcome of the matter. Moscow intends to hold on its power plants, which even the most recalcitrant countries are forced to refer, and will integrate a cycle of mutual dependence in all countries ranging from the Straits Gibraltar of the South China Sea. The vocation of Eurasian Russia at this point seems obvious, obvious to all but the bland bureaucrats in Brussels, which even in the face of open calls to the collaboration spent by Putin at the Security Conference held in Monaco on 7 February 2007 were felt "entitled" Who knows by whom, to reach out to the Russian leader.
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